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We analyse how institutional and political decisions are intertwined. Citizens who differ in 
their mobility and ability vote first on labour market integration and afterwards on education 
policy. The institutional decision on integration influences the succeeding education policy. 
More surprisingly, the prospect of voting on education policy also affects the preceding 
integration decision. There are incentives for citizens to vote strategically for the institutional 
setting in which their preferred education policy is more successful at the polls. We show how 
a ‘joint’ analysis of the institutional and political decision alters the results compared to an 
‘isolated’ analysis of either of the two decisions. Also, we explore how the two-dimensional 
heterogeneity of the citizens shapes the voting equilibrium in our setting with sequential 
voting. 
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Political decisions take place within a particular institutional framework. This institutional
framework aﬀects the beneﬁts of diﬀerent political alternatives and the distribution of these
beneﬁts across the electorate. It thus inﬂuences the support for diﬀerent alternatives at the
polls. Once citizens are aware of this forward linkage between the institutional framework
and the succeeding political decisions, this relationship will in turn aﬀect their preferences
over diﬀerent institutional settings. The choice of the institutional framework itself is then
inﬂuenced by its impact on the succeeding political decisions. Each voter faces an incentive to
strategically support an institutional arrangement that later raises the number of votes for the
preferred policy. Thus, there is also a backward linkage, meaning that future political decisions
aﬀect preceding institutional ones.
In this paper, we analyse these interactions between the institutional and the political de-
cisions. More precisely, we explore the interplay between the institutional decision on labour-
market integration and the political decision concerning the quality of public education. We
focus on the choices in a poor, small country whose labour market can be integrated into
the labour market of a rich, large jurisdiction. The citizens of the small country are charac-
terised by diﬀerent ability and mobility levels. This two-dimensional heterogeneity gives rise
to individually distinct preferences over integration regimes and education policies.
Public decision making is captured here by a model with sequential voting. The citizens
of the small country ﬁrst vote on the integration regime and then on the education policy.
As we will argue, this timing reﬂects a ‘natural hierarchy’ of rather long-run institutional and
short-run political decisions. Each of the two elections is boiled down to a zero-one decision,
and in each stage the alternative that gains the majority of votes is implemented.
This very simple structure enables us to highlight how a joint analysis of the institutional
and political decision alters the results compared to an isolated analysis of either of the two de-
cisions. For instance, in the case of an exogenously given education policy, a citizen’s preferred
integration regime - non-integrated or integrated labour markets - depends on her mobility only.
However, once the decision on education policy is also endogenously determined, each voter’s
favoured integration regime depends on both her mobility and ability. So, the two-dimensional
2heterogeneity of the citizens becomes important when the interplay between the institutional
and the political decision is taken into account.
More importantly, the interaction between these decisions might reverse the election out-
come compared to isolated votes. Under some circumstances, labour-market integration does
not gain a majority at the polls for any exogenously given education policy. Yet under the
very same circumstances integration wins if the education policy is also endogenously deter-
mined. The reason is that some citizens now strategically vote for labour-market integration,
since their favoured education policy gains a majority only with this institutional arrangement.
Again, the interaction between the two decisions makes all the diﬀerence.
Our paper is mainly related to three strands of the literature. First, a number of articles
analyse the potentially positive eﬀects of open borders on human capital formation. For in-
stance, Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1998), Stark and Wang (2002) and Vidal (1998)
all argue that the opportunity of emigration raises private investment in education.1 Unlike
these articles, we consider the incentives of integrated labour markets on investment in public
education. These incentives are very diﬀerent as a consequence of the very diﬀerent distribu-
tional implications of public and private investments. In our model, labour-market integration
can lead to more or less public spending on education. Wildasin (2000) also analyses pub-
licly ﬁnanced education in the context of labour-market integration, but, like the other papers
mentioned above, voting is not considered at all and integration is exogenously given.
Second, there is a well-developed literature on the political economy of education. For
instance, De Fraja (2001), Epple and Romano (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) and
Stiglitz (1974) analyse voting on education policy and the redistributional implications of the
election outcome. Unlike our paper, however, none of these papers links this political choice
with voting on a second issue. Similarly, several papers which analyse education policy in a
dynamic setting focus entirely on one-dimensional voting (see, e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar,
1992, Gradstein and Justman, 1997, Haupt, 2005, and Soares, 2003).
Few papers extend this literature by considering two-dimensional voting on education policy
and social security as two parts of an intergenerational contract (see, e.g., Rangel, 2003).
There, the analysis is, however, restricted to individuals who only diﬀer in age. Poutvaara
1For an empirical analysis, see Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008).
3(2006) generalizes this approach by allowing for simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate
and investment in public education when individuals diﬀer in age and productivity and when
the wage tax ﬁnances public education and pension beneﬁts. He thus considers the linkages
between diﬀerent public expenditures and the consequences for the voting equilibria while we
focus on incentives for strategic voting in the absence of any link via the public budget.
Third, our paper is also related to the political-economic literature on integration. In these
contributions, citizens vote on political integration on grounds of public good provision (e.g.,
Alesina and Spolaore, 1997) or income distribution across regions (e.g., Bolton and Roland,
1997). Basically, these articles focus on the voters’ trade-oﬀ between the eﬃciency gains of a
large state and the beneﬁts of having a government closer to their preferences in a small state
(see Alesina and Spolaore, 2003, for an overview). By contrast, we are interested in the exact
interaction between diﬀerent public decisions within a given political entity.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we introduce our political-economic
model. In Section 3, the equilibrium education policy is analysed for a given integration regime,
and in Section 4, the emerging integration regime itself is explored. In Section 5, we discuss the
additional insights that arise from considering two-dimensional voting instead of isolated votes.
In particular, we focus on the interdependence of the two public decisions and the relevance of
the two-dimensional heterogeneity. Section 6 concludes with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC MODEL
In this section, we develop a simple political-economic model that allows us to analyse the
interplay between voting on labour-market integration and education policy when citizens diﬀer
in ability and mobility. Our world consists of two entities - one rich, large jurisdiction and one
poor, small jurisdiction. The focus here is on the political choices in the small jurisdiction and
on migration from the small to the large jurisdiction. We ﬁrst present the political framework
before elaborating more on the economic setting.
2.1 POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
In the small jurisdiction, citizens have to take an institutional and a political decision. First,
they vote on whether their country’s labour market will be integrated into the larger juris-
4diction’s one or not. This is a zero-one choice. In the case of integrated labour markets (I),
all legal and political barriers to the free movement of workers between the two jurisdictions
are dismantled. By contrast, in the case of non-integrated labour markets (NI),n oi n t e r -
jurisdictional labour movement is possible. The large jurisdiction simply accepts the choice of
the small country.
Second, the citizens of the small country vote on education policy (E,t),w h e r eE and t
stand for the quality of public education and the individual tax payment that is necessary to
ﬁnance this policy. There are again two alternatives. Citizens choose either a low quality of
public education E or a high quality E,w i t hE>E .W h i l et h el o wl e v e lE can be achieved at
zero costs and zero taxes, the high level E leads to positive costs and thus requires positive taxes.
In the latter case, a lump-sum tax t>0 is levied on all citizens to ﬁnance public education
spending. Note that all citizens, independent of their ultimate place of residence, pay this tax.2
Also, there is only public education; individuals do not have any private alternatives.
2.2 ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Individuals native to the small jurisdiction are ex-ante heterogeneous in two dimensions. First,
they diﬀer in their individual ability level a. This ability determines how eﬀectively an indi-
vidual can take advantage of the public education quality, as explored in more detail below.
Second, citizens diﬀer in their inter-jurisdictional mobility. As will become evident soon,
moving to the larger jurisdiction is always beneﬁcial for the small country’s citizens from a
narrow economic point of view. However, even in the case of labour-market integration citizens
migrate only with an individually speciﬁc probability p.D i ﬀerences in this probability reﬂect
the individual degree of attachment to one’s native region. Some people have close links to their
home region or ﬁnd it diﬃcult to cope with a new environment. Others, by contrast, have only
weak ties to their native region or integrate into a new community easily. But even if people
are mobile, migration is nothing that occurs with certainty. It is inﬂuenced by the environment
of the individuals, in particular by their professional options and their social relations - be it
2The ﬁscal implication of migration, i.e. the loss of the tax base, is not considered here. Adding such ﬁscal
eﬀects, however, would only reinforce the downside of labour-market integration that is taken into account in
our model. It would obviously weaken the case for integration, but without changing our qualitative results.
For papers in which mobility of individuals also implies mobility of tax-payers, see, e.g., Andersson and Konrad
(2003), Haupt and Janeba (2008), Poutvaara (2008), and Thum and Uebelmesser (2003). In a political-economic
setting, Boerner and Uebelmesser (2007) not only study the eﬀect of mobile tax-payers but also of mobile voters.
5preferences of an individual’s partner, or parents and other relatives in need of care. Thus
individual mobility is expressed in terms of an individual migration probability.
To capture the heterogeneity in both ability and mobility, the individual characteristics
are assumed to be distributed according to a joint c.d.f F(a,p):[ 0 ,a] × [0,1] 7→ [0,1], a>0.





f(a,p)dadp =1has to hold. For simplicity, the
size of the population N is normalised to one so that the joint density f(a,p) is identical to
the ‘number’ of individuals characterised by (a,p). The distribution of these characteristics
is common knowledge while the precise characteristics of an individual are only known to the
individual herself. We do not impose any further assumption on the joint c.d.f F(a,p).I n
particular, we neither presume nor exclude that ability and mobility are correlated. People
who are identical in one dimension may well diﬀer in the other. To emphasise this feature, we
use diﬀerent indices to indicate an individual’s ability and mobility and refer to individuals as
(ai,p j)-types in the following.
After having received education, each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour,
either at home or abroad. Wage wi of an individual with ability ai then depends on whether




A(M)aiE if the worker stays at home,
δaiE if the worker emigrates.
(1)
For obvious reasons, the individual wage increases with the quality of public education E and
the individual ability ai. Public education is the more eﬀective, the better the individual ability,
and vice versa. A(M) and δ stand for the overall productivity of the economy at home and
abroad, respectively, where M, M ∈ [0,1], denotes the number or share of citizens of the small
country leaving for the large jurisdiction. The function A(M) decreases with migration M,
capturing the negative impact of outmigration and the resultant loss of human capital for the
source country.3
Productivities A(M) and δ can be interpreted as wages per eﬃciency unit of education-
augmented ability at home and abroad, respectively. We assume that δ>A (M) holds for all
3With A(M), we indirectly capture the aggregate level of human capital in the small economy, which declines
as a result of outmigration. The positive impact of aggregate human capital on productivity has been discussed
in great detail in the new economic growth literature. See, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) for an
overview.
6M: the overall productivity is always higher in the rich jurisdiction than in the poor one. Thus,
for all education and ability levels, the workers who are native to the small country receive
higher wages abroad than at home. These wage diﬀerentials set the stage for migration from
the small to the large jurisdiction when labour markets are integrated. By contrast, there are
no incentives to move to the small country. Finally note that since the rich jurisdiction is large,
any inﬂow from the small country is negligible and does not aﬀect its productivity δ.4
Individuals are risk-neutral and aim at maximising their (expected) net incomes. Having
discussed individual wages, we can determine the expected net incomes of the small country’s
citizens. In the case of integrated labour markets (I), migration is possible and beneﬁcial. An
individual of (ai,p j)-type emigrates and receives the wage δaiE with probability pj;s h es t a y s
at home and receives the wage A(M)aiE with probability 1−pj. No matter whether she moves
or not, she has to pay the tax t. The expected net income of the (ai,p j)-type is thus given by
BI
ij =( 1− pj)A(M)aiE + pjδaiE − t,( 2 )
where t =0(t = t)i fE = E (E = E), as discussed above. Note that M denotes here and in
the following the expected number of emigrants.
In the case of non-integrated labour markets (NI), emigration is no option and net income
boils down to
BNI
ij = A(0)aiE − t.( 3 )
2.3 TIMING AND INFORMATION
Labour-market integration constitutes an institutional decision that is very diﬃcult to change,
at least in the short run; and any revision of such a decision takes time. By contrast, education
policy can be altered much more easily, even in the short run. For this reason, we distinguish
between long-run institutional and (potentially) short-run political decisions. To capture this
decision hierarchy, voting is assumed to be sequential. At the ﬁrst stage, the citizens of the small
jurisdiction vote on labour-market integration. At the second stage, given the institutional
choice, they vote on the quality of public education.
4Similar to A(M), δ can be seen as reﬂecting the level of human capital in the large region. Due to our
‘small-and-poor-country’ assumption, this level is, however, unaﬀected by migration in the course of labour
market integration. The parameter δ can also capture the quality of education in the large country, which is
again independent of the decisions in the small country. Thus, δ is constant.
7When the sequential voting takes place, each citizen knows her own ability level and mi-
gration probability as well as the distribution of individual characteristics. But she does not
know whether she will ultimately migrate or not in the case of integrated labour markets. This
will be revealed only after voting has taken place. A citizen’s choice at the polls thus depends
on her migration probability. Moreover, voters are rational and anticipate the impact of the
decisions on their (expected) net income.
After the collective decisions have been made at the polls, the proposals that receive the
majority of votes will be implemented, and all economic ‘actions’ will be carried out. Individuals
will instantaneously acquire education given the quality of public education and their individual
ability level, migrate with their individual probability in the case of integrated labour markets,
supply inelastically one unit of labour, receive their wages and pay the resultant ‘education’ tax
to their native jurisdiction. Since all economic actions occur ‘automatically’ in our political-
economic framework, this model allows us to focus entirely on the institutional and political
choices and their interplay. We solve the model as usual by means of backward induction.
3 VOTING ON EDUCATION POLICY
We start by analysing the vote on education policy at the second stage. The individually




, depends not only on the citizen’s ability and mobility,
but also on the outcome of the voting on labour-market integration at the ﬁrst stage. The
integration regime, either (NI) or (I), substantially aﬀects the voter’s incentives at the second
stage. We analyse the vote on education policy ﬁrst for non-integrated labour markets and
then for integrated ones, thereby exploring the diﬀerences in the two cases in detail.
3.1 NON-INTEGRATED LABOUR MARKETS
In the case of non-integrated labour markets, institutional restrictions prevent any inter-
jurisdictional migration. As individual mobility is irrelevant in this setting, the citizens de
facto diﬀer only in ability, and this characteristic determines their political preferences.
Each citizen supports the education policy that gives her the highest net income. Comparing








(E,t) = A(0)aiE − t R A(0)aiE = BNI
ij
¯ ¯
(E,0) ⇐⇒ ai R
t
A(0)(E − E)
=: aNI.( 4 )




while those with a low ability level ai,i . e . ai <a NI, vote for the alternative (E,0).
The explanation for this result is straightforward. The individual wage rise in response to a
higher quality of education is the larger, the higher the individual ability level. High-ability
types particularly beneﬁt from quality level E while the corresponding costs are equally shared




redistributes from low-ability to high-
ability types.5










f(a,p)dadp.6 Below, we will compare this share, which might or might not
exceed 0.5, with the corresponding share in the case of integrated labour markets.
3.2 INTEGRATED LABOUR MARKETS
We next consider voting in the case of integrated labour markets. Migration is now not only
possible but also beneﬁcial for all workers native to the small country, since the wage per
eﬃciency unit is always higher abroad. So, some of the small country’s citizens will move to
the other jurisdiction.
Even if the identities of the future migrants are not known when individuals vote on ed-






pf(a,p)dadp. Individuals foresee the number of migrants as the distribution of
characteristics, which completely determines M, is assumed to be common knowledge.
Each citizen votes again for the education policy that gives her the highest expected net
income. Now, individual mobility in addition to individual ability shapes the political prefer-
5A similar redistribution occurs in Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), but for diﬀerent reasons. In their paper,
a majority deliberately pushes through an education policy that excludes the poor from higher education (see
also Haupt, 2005). In our model, the redistribution results from our assumptions on the wage function (cf. (1))
and the tax system. If we replace the lump-sum tax by a progressive one, or if public education mainly increases
the productivity of less able individuals, low-ability citizens might be the chief beneﬁciaries of public education.
But even then, the fundamental mechanisms that we explore here and in the following would remain the same.
All we need are two groups of individuals who beneﬁtd i ﬀerently from public education and thus - as we will
elaborate below - face diﬀerent incentives to (strategically) vote on integration at the ﬁrst stage. In any case,
a coalition of low-ability and high-ability individuals against intermediate-ability individuals, i.e. a coalition of
"the ends against the middle” (cf. Epple and Romano, 1996), cannot be an issue here as there is no possibility
to opt out of the public system and receive privately provided education instead.
6More precisely, the upper limit of integration as to the ability level is e a =m i n ( a
NI,a). For convenience, our
notation abstracts from the possibility of a boundary solution.














[(1 − pj)A(M)+pjδ](E − E)
=: aI(pj),( 5 )
where we make use of (2). Similarly to our previous result (see (4)), all citizens with a high




while those with a low ability
level ai,i . e . ai <a I(pj),v o t ef o rt h ea l t e r n a t i v e(E,0). But in contrast to the outcome in
the case of non-integrated markets, the critical ability level aI(pj) is now individual-speciﬁc. It
decreases with the individual migration probability pj, which follows from our assumption about
the productivity gap between the two countries, i.e. δ>A (M) for all M. Using the critical











3.3 THE IMPACT OF INTEGRATION ON EDUCATION POLICY
To identify the diﬀerences between the cases of integrated and non-integrated labour markets
more clearly, we compare the critical ability levels (4) and (5), and ﬁnd
aI(pj) R aNI ⇐⇒ pj Q
A(0) − A(M)
δ − A(M)
=: pc ∈ [0,1).( 6 )
Figure 1 illustrates this relationship. It shows how labour-market integration changes the
election outcome compared to the setting without integration. On the one hand, low-ability





an open economy if they are suﬃciently mobile. The characteristics (ai,p j) of these ‘ﬂoating’





closed economy, vote for proposal (E,0) in an open economy if they are suﬃciently immobile.
Their characteristics (ai,p j) lie in area B. For short, we refer to these two types as area-C types




independently of the integration regime while area-D types always favour policy (E,0).
The economic explanation for the changes in the voting behaviour is straightforward. Ed-
ucation is the more eﬀective, the more advanced an economy is in terms of productivity.
Labour-market integration thus reinforces the positive impact of the quality of education on
10the wages of those workers who end up in the more productive jurisdiction. By contrast, it
diminishes this positive impact on the wages of those individuals who remain in the small
country, since outmigration distorts the domestic economy, reduces aggregate human capital
and thus decreases its productivity. Hence, mobile workers now fancy education more even if
they are less able while immobile workers become more reluctant to support a high education
q u a l i t ye v e ni ft h e ya r em o r ea b l e .













j p 0 1
c p




can be greater or smaller in the case of integrated labour markets than in the case of





more votes in an open economy than in a closed one, i.e. V I >VNI. Otherwise, this policy
will gain fewer votes with integrated labour-markets than without, i.e. V I <VNI.
The citizens’ voting behaviour gives rise to two diﬀerent cases. First, a dominant education
policy can emerge, meaning that the type of integration regime in place, either (I) or (NI),




or (E,0), wins the election at the second stage. If




will gain a majority at the polls, no matter
whether labour markets are integrated or not.7 Similarly, the alternative (E,0) will always win




is assumed to win the election if V =0 .5 holds. This does not aﬀect our
qualitative results.
11in the election if V I < 0.5 and V NI < 0.5 hold.
Second, an integration-driven education policy m i g h ta r i s e ,m e a n i n gt h a tt h et y p eo fi n t e g r a -
tion regime in place ultimately predetermines which proposal wins in the election at the second




wins in the election in an open economy





receives a majority only in a closed economy while the alternative
(E,0) is successful at the polls in an open economy.8
The distinction between dominant and integration-driven education policies proves to be
important for analysing the election outcome at the ﬁrst stage. We explore the details in the
next section.
4 VOTING ON LABOUR-MARKET INTEGRATION
As we have shown, the outcome of the vote on education policy can hinge on the integration
regime. This potential impact of the integration regime on the chosen education policy aﬀects
the decision on labour-market integration itself, as we will see in this section. To analyse the
outcome of the election at the ﬁrst stage, we take up our previous categorisation. We ﬁrst
consider cases in which a dominant education policy emerges. Then, we look at cases in which
an integration-driven education policy arises.
4.1 DOMINANT EDUCATION POLICY




is a dominant education policy. Voters
anticipate that this proposal will win the election at the second stage. In order to identify
their preferred integration regime in this case, we compare the (expected) net income of an




.U s i n g











= pc.( 7 )
8In Haupt and Uebelmesser (2007), we also ﬁnd that in the presence of individuals who are heterogeneous
in two dimensions labour-market integration potentially aﬀects the educational choice. This is established in a
setting with private investment in education and in the absence of political-economic considerations.
12That is, all citizens with a high migration probability pj,i . e .pj ≥ pc, vote for labour-market
integration (I) while those with a low probability pj,i . e .pj <p c, favour non-integrated labour
markets (NI).T h i s r e ﬂects the two opposing eﬀects of integration. On the one hand, it
provides the opportunity to take advantage of higher wages abroad. On the other hand, it
depresses wages at home, as outmigration reduces the productivity of the domestic economy.
The former positive eﬀect on expected individual net income dominates the latter negative one
for those individuals who are suﬃciently mobile in terms of migration probability while the
others suﬀer from integration.
The situation is very similar if V I < 0.5 and V NI < 0.5 hold. The proposal (E,0) is
then the dominant education policy. Comparing (expected) individual net incomes with and











= pc,( 8 )
where we again made us of (2) and (3). As in the previous case, the mobile citizens favour
integrated labour markets while the immobile ones prefer non-integrated markets. The prob-
ability threshold that divides the two groups is the same as before, and so are the reasons for
the preferred policies.
We conclude that dominant education policies give rise to dominant integration policies.




or (E,0) wins at the second stage does not inﬂuence
t h ev o t ea tt h eﬁrst stage, as long as the education policy is independent of the integration
regime. Under these circumstances, the voters’ preferred integration regimes depend only on
their degree of mobility.
4.2 INTEGRATION-DRIVEN EDUCATION POLICIES - FIRST CASE
While the outcome of the vote on integration is straightforward with dominant education
policies, it is less clear with integration-driven ones. Let us ﬁrst consider the case in which V I ≥




will be the political outcome with integrated labour
markets, and the policy (E,0) with non-integrated ones. To identify the voters’ preferences on
integration, we now have to compare the (expected) individual net incomes that result from




w i t ht h o s et h a tr e s u l t
from non-integrated labour markets (NI) and the subsequent education policy (E,0).F r o m










[A(M)+pj (δ − A(M))]E − A(0)E
=: afid(pj).( 9 )
In this ﬁrst case, the afid(pj)-borderline slopes downward and intersects the vertical pc-line at
¡
pc,a NI¢
, as can be easily checked. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The individuals to the right
of the new borderline support labour-market integration while those to the left oppose it. Most
importantly, the voters’ preferred integration regimes now hinge not only on their mobility but
also on their ability.










1 j p 0 1 j p 0 1









1 j p 0 1 j p 0 1
c p
To understand the diﬀerences between this case and the previous one, we focus on the
‘ﬂoating’ voters of area-E and area-F type. The area-E type voters would oppose integration
in the case of a dominant education policy for the reasons explored above. Their migration
probability, however, is still rather close to the critical value pc so that their expected loss from
integration is not too large. Moreover, their ability is rather high so that they can substantially




will receive a majority in the
14succeeding election only if labour markets are integrated. The area-E types thus vote for
integration (I) in order to push their preferred education policy.
It is the opposite for area-F types. These voters would support integration in the case of
a dominant education policy. Their expected beneﬁts from integration, however, are not very
large, since their migration probability exceeds the critical value pc only to a small extent.





given their rather low ability. Consequently, the area-F types vote for non-integrated markets
(NI), as their preferred education policy (E,0) only wins in a closed economy.
We have thus shown how the presence of these strategic eﬀects distinguishes the case of
integration-driven education policies from the case of dominant ones. If the education policy
hinges on the integration regime, citizens have incentives to vote strategically on integration
to promote their preferred education policy in the succeeding election. Then the impact of the
integration regime on the succeeding education policy feeds back on the integration decision
itself. In this sense, there is both a forward and a backward linkage between the two choices.
This two-way relationship implies that the decision on integration depends not only on the
citizens’ mobility but also on their ability. By contrast, in the case of dominant education
policies the vote on integration only hinges on individual mobility.




would win in an open economy does not imply that labour-
market integration receives the majority of votes, and vice versa. To see this, we compare the
threshold values afid(pj) as deﬁn e di n( 9 )a n daI(pj) as deﬁn e di n( 5 )
afid(pj) R aI(pj) ⇐⇒ pj Q
A(0) − A(M)
δ − A(M)
= pc.( 1 0 )
That is, the afid-line is above the aI-line up to the critical level pc and below it thereafter, as





economy completely contain the set of supporters of integrated labour markets, nor vice versa.




at the second stage, independent of
the integration regime in place. This can be seen as these types are above both the bold aI-line
and the dotted aNI-line. These citizens, nevertheless, vote against labour-market integration at
the ﬁrst stage, although they anticipate that their p r e f e r r e de d u c a t i o np o l i c yw i l lb ed e f e a t e d
at the polls in a closed economy. The reason is that given their rather low mobility level, they




. In this sense, they





Unlike them, area-H types always vote for policy (E,0) at the second stage, independent
of the integration regime. This is indicated in Figure 3 where these types are below both the
bold aI- l i n ea n dt h ed o t t e daNI-line. Yet these citizens vote for labour-market integration at
the ﬁrst stage, although they know that their prefe r r e de d u c a t i o np o l i c yw i l ll o s ei na no p e n
economy. But given their rather high mobility level, their expected beneﬁts from integration




. In this sense, they
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4.3 INTEGRATION-DRIVEN EDUCATION POLICIES - SECOND CASE
Finally, let us consider the case in which V NI ≥ 0.5 >V I holds. Since the analysis of this
case is analogous to the previous one, we can make it brief. Now, labour-market integration
(I) implies that education policy (E,0) wins in the succeeding election while non-integrated




receives a majority. Comparing the resultant (expected)
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, as illustrated in Figure 4. Now the individuals to the right of this
borderline vote for labour-market integration while those to the left oppose it.
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This voting behaviour is again compared with that in the case of a dominant education
policy. As before, we focus on the ‘ﬂoating’ voters. Area-J types, who would oppose integration
in the case of a dominant education policy, now support integration. By strategically voting for
labour-market integration (I), they push their preferred education policy (E,0). In contrast to
them, area-K types, who would favour integration in the case of a dominant education policy,
now ﬂoat into the anti-integration camp. They strategically vote for non-integrated labour





175 TWO-DIMENSIONAL VOTING AND HETEROGENEITY
Political problems are typically multidimensional, as in the current setting with two policy
variables. In many circumstances, however, a hierarchy of decisions emerges; that is, decisions
occur in a ‘natural’ sequence. As has already been discussed above, this is the case, for instance,
when we consider short-run political choices within long-run institutional arrangements. Then,
the decisions on the institutional framework are typically considered to take place prior to
the decisions on policies within this framework; and the political decisions can be expected
to be more easily changed than the institutional ones. Based on this reasoning, we have
analysed sequential voting to determine the institutional and political equilibrium. We have
thus partitioned the two-dimensional voting process into two uni-dimensional voting stages.
This approach is obviously convenient from a ‘technical’ perspective. As it is well-known,
simultaneous voting on multi-dimensional issues causes severe methodological problems, since
a Condorcet winner does not necessarily exist.9 Even in our very simple model, pairwise
voting on the four alternatives {I,(E,t)}, {NI,(E,t)}, {I,(E,0)} and {NI,(E,0)} can lead
to voting cycles. By splitting up the public decisions into two elections, we avoid such problems
and generate a structure-induced equilibrium (cf. Shapsle, 1979).
B u te v e ni fw ec a nb o i ld o w np o l i t i c a lp r o c e s s e si nt h i sw a y ,i ti ss t i l li m p o r t a n tt oc o n s i d e r
the diﬀerent votes as joint decisions and not as isolated ones. Analysing the interplay between
the two elections does indeed provide additional insights, as the following example highlights.
Assume that for a given education policy, there is a slim majority for non-integrated labour
markets (NI). That is, the citizens whose migration probability pj is below the threshold
value pc form a majority. Assume, moreover, that for non-integrated markets, the education
policy (E,0) narrowly wins at the polls. That is, the individuals whose ability ai is below the
threshold value aNI comprise a majority. At ﬁrst glance, one might expect that the outcome
(NI) and (E,0) also constitutes an equilibrium once the two elections are jointly considered.
But, as our analysis shows, this needs not to be the case.
If, for instance, the number of area-C types suﬃciently exceeds that of area-B types (see




in an open economy, as
9See, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Mueller (2003) for an extensive discussion.
18argued above. This aﬀects the share of votes in favour of labour-market integration. Once
the number of area-E types suﬃciently exceeds the number of area-F types (see Figure 2),









,w h i c h
turns the results based on analysing the two elections as isolated decisions on its head.
Moreover, for a given education policy, only individual mobility determines whether a citizen
favours labour-market integration or not in our setting. Once we consider the interaction
between the two elections, a voter’s decision on integration also hinges on her ability. Similarly,
the preferences over diﬀerent education policies do not only depend on ability but also on
mobility. So multi-dimensional heterogeneity is important for voting outcomes, and its impact
is particularly decisive when we consider multi-dimensional decisions. We are thus able to
evaluate how increasing the heterogeneity with respect to the number of policy instruments
aﬀects the identity of the decisive group and the political equilibrium when voters (potentially)
diﬀer in several dimensions.
6C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
This paper illustrates how long-run institutional and short-run political decisions are inter-
twined. In our setting, the decision on labour-market integration aﬀects the succeeding ed-
ucation policy. Perhaps more surprisingly, the prospect of voting on education policy also
inﬂuences the preceding integration choice. Citizens have incentives to vote strategically for
the institutional setting that raises the number of votes in favour of their preferred education
policy. So there is both a forward and a backward linkage between the two decisions. This
interplay means that it is important to consider the two choices jointly. As we have argued, the
resultant equilibrium policy can substantially diﬀer from the outcomes that isolated votes would
suggest. Also, the two-dimensional heterogeneity plays an important role when we consider
the interplay of the two choices.
Our setting can be seen as reﬂecting some important aspects of the accession of the eastern
European countries to the European Union, which will ultimately lead to the full integration
of the new members into the common EU labour market. As the institutional decision is
concerned, one might think of an eastern European country’s vote on joining the EU (labour
19market). This is certainly a long-run decision in the sense that it is very diﬃcult to reverse.
Within the selected institutional framework, the country chooses its education policy. As this
decision can be reversed almost anytime, it is of a more short-run nature.
Of course, accession aﬀects not only the labour market and education policy, but inﬂuences
many more areas of the citizens’ political, social and economic life. Labour-market integration,
however, is a particularly important part of the accession process. Given the close link between
labour-market integration and education policy, we focus here on two relevant and intertwined
policies. But as we always have to restrict our analysis to selected areas, we are not able to
explore all phenomenons surrounding integration. For instance, the accession process normally
involves a substantial amount of transfers to a poor country’s (non-migrating) citizens, which
- in the light of our model - can be thought of as beneﬁts necessary to compensate them for
any losses related to the opening of their country. These transfers might also explain why no
poor country has yet declined to join the European Union. Extending the setting such that the
large, rich jurisdiction is more explicitly modelled would allow us to incorporate these transfers
and the strategic interactions between the jurisdictions in our analysis.
As a further extension, the underlying dynamics could be modelled more explicitly by ap-
plying an overlapping-generations approach. In such a framework, the parental generation
decides on labour-market integration and the quality of education that their children receive.
The basic outcome of this more sophisticated approach, however, would be the same as long
as the parents’ voting behaviour is suﬃciently driven by their interest in their children’s well-
being. We think this is the case for two reasons. First, parents act altruistically regarding their
oﬀspring. Second, integration mainly aﬀects their children, be it positive or negative, and not
the parental generation, because of the time gaps between the institutional decision, the ulti-
mate implementation, and the individual adjustment to the new institutional environment.10
Consequently, the parental choices are based on their expectations about their children’s ability
ai (i.e. their children’s ability to beneﬁt from education) and mobility pj (i.e. their children’s
ability to beneﬁt from integration). Their votes are thus in line with the logic of our static
setting. In this sense, our very tractable model can be interpreted as a ‘reduced’ form of an
10For instance, although the ﬁrst eastern European countries already joined the EU in 2004, their citizens
still cannot freely move to all old Member States as a result of transitional restrictions. And even the limited
opportunities they have are rather used by the young, ﬂexible generation than by the old, settled citizens.
20overlapping-generations approach.
We could further consider repeated voting in consecutive periods. In this case, citizens
will most of the time decide on education policy only, given the fact that integration is less
easily and therefore less often reversed. In ‘single-issue’ periods, our analysis of the voting
behaviour in the second stage still applies. The majority, however, might vary over time as the
composition of the citizens changes in the course of emigration.
Finally, the relationship between institutional and political decisions can be analysed in
many other contexts. Consider, for instance, the interplay between economic and political
integration on the one hand and tax policy on the other hand. The decision on integration
aﬀects the future tax policy, due to increased or decreased international competition. Once
voters anticipate this link, it shapes their preferences over the integration regime. Many people
indeed oppose globalisation because of its apparent impact on domestic policies. These issues,
however, are left for future research. Also, a normative analysis that complements the current
positive one can be the subject of future papers.
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